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Social Science 
BUSINESS AFTER THE WAR 
ARTHUR R. UPGRI~N 
Federal Reserve Bank of k[inneapolis 
There can be little question but that the most striking develop-
ment of the wartime period is the steady and rapid rise in the na-
tional income of the people of the United States. From a level 
slightly in excess of 70 billion dollars in 1939 the national income 
increased to 76 billion dollars in 1940, to 95 billion dollars in 1941, 
and to more than 119 billion dollars in 1942. Further increases can 
be confidently expected, and in fact, Secretary Jones of the Depart-
ment of Commerce recently estimated the national income for 1!)43 
at 135 billion dollars. This is one of the central facts in the wartime 
change_s in our economy. Our government has work for everyone 
able to contribute in the war program. It will find the means to pay 
for its expenditures. Its payments make incomes high. 
Through the year 1941 consumers were reasonably free to spend 
their new higher incomes in the purchase of consumer goods. Since 
1941, however, although incomes have been rising, ,expenditures of 
consumers for many kinds of goods have been falling. It now ap-
pears that in the present year, 1943, because of widespread short-
ages of goods, consumers' expenditures in almost all important lines 
will be greatly decreased. This situation is reflected and has its 
complement in the growth of total savings of the people of the 
United States. These increased in 1942 to a level of no less than 
26 billion dollars from 12 billion dollars in 1941, and from only 7 
billion dollars in 1!)40. It is, of course, to be hoped that a majority 
of consumers' savings will be invested in government securities in 
order that inflation may be checked. 
As a result of these changes, private residential housing is almost 
non-existent except for defense workers. Expenditures of consumers 
for all kinds of durable goods-automobiles, electric refrigerators, 
household appliances, in fact, of anything made of the new precious 
metals-will have been reduced by probably three-fourths from the 
annual level before Pearl Harbor. lVIany other kinds of expenditures 
of both consumers and businesses as well are being drastically re-
duced. In fact, civilian industries may not even be able to spend 
their depreciation allowance for plant and equipment to make good 
the Wear and tear of wartime years. The importance of even just 
these replacement expenditures is indicated in the fact that Ameri-
can industries' annual total depreciation charges are more than 5 
billion dollars. 
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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF VVAHTIME CHANGES FOR BUSINESS 
There exists an increasingly wide realization that an immense 
amount of deferred demand will have been accumulated during the 
years of the war. In a recent article (Harvard Business Review,. 
Autumn, 1942) Professor Sumner H. Slichter estimated the amounts 
of deferred dema1id that would be accumulated_by June 30, 1944. 
These are .give1rin Table I. · 
TABLE I. 
ESTIMATED DEFEUHED DEMANDS FOH Gooos THAT vVrLL BE 
ACCUMULATED IN THE UNITED STATES BY JUNE 30, 1944 
Deferred demand for housing .......................... $ 3.7 billion 
Deferred demand for consumers' durable goods........... 8.7 billion 
Private business construction and equipment deferred 
demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 billion 
Deferred priYale maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 billion · 
Deferred demand for consumers' semi-durable goods...... 3.0 billion 
Deferred public works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7 billion 
Deferred public maintenance ..................... ·..... 0.G billion 
Total Estimated Deferred Demand at 
June 30, 1944 ........................... $25.!J billion 
Not only will these huge amounts of needs be accumulated dur-
ing the war, but the public simultaneously is accumulating buying 
power that, in light of the "potential" but never realized deferred 
demand of the 1930's can make this huge wartime forced deferred 
demand into effective 111arket dcman.cl when the ·war is .ended. In a 
recent speech (New York Times, January 15, i943) David C. 
Prince, Vice President of General Electric Company, cited figures 
indicating that a backlog of buying power of 32 billion dollars would 
be accumulated by consumers by the end of 1943. In the depression 
years of the 1930's, in contrast, consumer debts were high a11d con~ , • 
··sumers' savings low, accompanied by huge losses in consumers' 
capital resources. In the present wartime period, however, consum-
ers are sharply increasing their savings, their investments, their 
bank deposits, and substantially reducing their debts. 
Reliance for a,high level for business after the war by no means 
is to be placed wholly upon accumulations of deferred demand even 
though they may be fully backed by increased savings and pre-
pared for by debt retirement. An even more significant factor is 
that the national income will be high throughout the years of the 
war. If reasonably high level incomes can be maintained after the 
war, the buying power such current incomes can generate will prove 
to be the greatest source of support for business. In addition, the 
combination of a high level national income. and accumulated 
financial resources gives excellent promise that business activity 
itself will be enough lo offer strong assurance of maintaining the 
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high level for the national i11come that was at first assumed merely 
to find out what its results can be and as they are next reviewed. 
THE NATURE OF CONSUMER "WANTS BASED ON A HIGH 
NATIONAL INCOME 
In 1941 when the national income was about 95 billion dollars, 
total purchases of consumers' and producers' goods for private ac-
count were at their maximum in recent years. Since 1941, as has 
been indicated above, the national income has further increased 
substantially to a level of about 115 billion dollars. We have reason-
ably adequate figures as to the quantities of goods the American 
people purchased in 1941 with the incomes they then enjoyed. 
Can "'e obtain an idea of what they would buy if they were free to 
dispose of a higher income than they have ever had to spend in the 
past? 
In Table ~ a comparison is made of the amounts of various 
classes of goods that were actually purchased in 1941 with the 
TABLE II. 
ESTilVIATED ANNUAL CONSUMER EXPENDITURES IN 1941 AND 
PnoJECTED PosTWAH EXPENDITURES AssUMED A NATIONAL 
lNcoME OF ABOUT $115,000,000,000 
Consumers' Expendilmes for: 
lVIanufaclured foods and like products ...... . 
All other nondurable commodities ...... .' ... . 
Tolnl nondurable goods ................ . 
Clothing and accessories, including shoes ... . 
All other semi-durable commodities ........ . 
Total expenditures l'or all services (heallh, 
education, recreation, etc.) ............. . 
Consumers' durable commodities .......... . 
Residential construction .................. . 








on a National 
Income of about 
$11.5,000,000,000) 



















amounts that wou)d be purchased if a larger income of 115 billion 
dollars could be freely spent for consumers' goods. A simple way 
of stating how such expenditures would be made as to various 
classes of goods, in view of the fact the American people have not 
been free to purchase with such higher incomes, is the assumption 
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that the American people do follow the practice of "keeping up with 
the Joneses." By this is meant that with a higher national income 
a larger number of people enjoy incomes, for example, ranging from 
$2,000 to $2,500 and a smaller number enjoy incomes from $1,500 
to $2,000. The directions in which the larger number of people 
would spend their higher incomes is based upon the belief that as 
the one group moves into the higher income class of the other group 
their outlays for goods and services take the budget pattern of the 
latter group. Since budgets are known in advance by inquiry into 
the expenditures of all inco'me groups we can determine the new 
totals for consumers' expenditures based upon their higher level 
incomes. In Table 2 it is the increased expenditures that are indi-
cated in comparison with the outlays of consumers in 1941. 
The foregoing total figures are not to be reconciled directly with 
the national income for the reason that the amounts given above 
are not given on a 
0
basis comparable with figures for the national 
income. This is owing to the fact that the net national income is 
always calculated after deduction for various items; i.e., it is a net 
figure, including particularly, for example, that part of output 
which is required to make good depreciation of durable goods. The 
economy produces some goods for consumers' replacements and 
they are a part of total production, of total consumers' takings, but 
they are not a part of the net national income .. 
Consumer expenditures, as listed above by classes for 1941, 
therefore embrace quantities taken both for replacement and for. 
ordinary consumption. However, since the same basis has been used 
in the esti_mates for consumer demands in the postwar year, the 
comparison is appropriate to show amounts and directions of th~ 
increases in outlays corisumers would make when they again will 
be free to dispose of their incomes in accordance with their free 
choices. The higher level of national income would result in a total 
enlargement of consumer takings of 25 billion dollars. 
These estimates are given not as forecasts but as a way of ap-
proach to the problem of the markets business may. expect after 
the war, and as a way of inquiring into the problems of financing· 
business that will come to the fore wqen war production is to cease. 
Business itself, on its own superior knowledge, will make its final 
estimations b;y: individual companies and individual products. When 
this is clone more reliable figures will be available for the financial 
advance budgeting that is needed. It is this kind of pla,nning that is 
needed and that will be approved by everyone. 
THE OUTLOOK FOR THE NATiONAL INCOME AFTER' THE WAR 
The question, of course, that is in the mind of every credit man 
and retailer is what is the outlook for business activity and national 
income after the war. Will the tremendous debt that the nation has 
built up eat into the postwar prosperity, and will business custo-
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mers have adequate incomes to assure a large market and be good 
credit risks? 
The question of how well our government can manage its debt 
after the war can most simply be put in terms of a single question: 
Can we maintain a high national incom.e after the war? 
If the answer to this question is "Yes" there certainly is no rea-· 
son why our government cannot take care of interest and even 
achieve some retirement of the debt that will be outstanding when 
the war ends. 
In the first place, there is certainly one kernel of truth in the 
statement that a national debt differs from a corporate or individ-
ual debt. The difference is that whatever we tax our people to pay 
interest on debt, that interest is paid to our people and becomes 
income to all who receive it. 
Consequently, if the income of our people can be maintained at 
a high level there should be no unsolvable problem in seeing to it 
that the government takes in enough money to pay interest on the 
debt. The problem is one of collecting taxes from us all and dispei·s-
ing interest to us all. Unlike a debt owed abroad, we as a nation 
do not lose anything when we collect taxes to pay interest that is 
returned at once to our people. But, if the income of our people 
declines substantially, the taxes will not yield enough and it will be 
difficult to increase them. 
Tim NATIONAL INc01vrn IN Hl4:1 
For 1943 Secretary Jones of the Department of Commerce has 
estimated the total national income at $135 billion. Last year the 
figure was slightly above $115 billion. Somewhere betiveen these 
two figures, perhaps we may accept a fig·ure of $120 billion, lies that 
income which would represent reasonably full activity and reason-
ably full employment. No doubt we shall produce more than that 
during the war ·but boys will be employed in producing it, who, 
after the war, should return to schools, men above sixty-five will 
be employed who will naturally wish to retire, many women will 
be employed who will not wish employment after the war, and we 
shall probably return to a shorter work week. 
FACTORS FAVORABLE TO THE :fyIAINTENANCE OF A I-Irnu LEVEL 
NATIONAL INCOME ~FTER THE WAR 
It has been estimated that by the end of the present year the 
American people will have accumulated no less than $32 billion of 
wartime savings or financial reserves which they will want to use 
for the purchase of civilian goods when they are again available. 
It has also been estimated that by about the end of the present 
year no less than $26 billion of deferred demands will have accumu-
lated-representing goods our people have been quite prepared to 
pay for but which have not been available to them. It is interest-
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ing indeed that current financial accumulations and debt repay-
ment have proceeded at such a rapid rate as to keep the abi)ity of 
our people to buy so very high. 
It is a curious fact that when the end of the war comes, even 
though there might be subs"tantial postarmistice unemployment, 
there is every prospect that ability to buy currently will heavily 
outrun the immediate ability of industry to produce the goods that 
will be wanted. Thus on balance, the economy would be stimulated 
and there is far wider agreement that some of the wartime controls 
-;-such as price and inventory controls-must be temporarily con-
tinued to prevent an undue postwar boom. 
:Moreover, governments do not at once end wartime expenditures 
with the cessation of hostilities. Rather wartime expenditures tend 
to continue for a period of time, thus sustaining the national in-
come levels while civilian industries are taking hold again and, 
through their payrolls and payments for raw materials, are build-
ing up the share of the income that is secured by ci:vilian produc-
tion. · 
After the war, as has been pointed out, taxes can be substan~ 
. tially reduced. That, too, is most stimulating. It is highly significant 
that there is wide agreement among all shades of opinion that the 
first correction in our tax structure should come in corporate taxes. 
Reductions in corporate tax rates can be very stimulating to busi-
ness. 
Another very favorable factor is that technological improvement 
during the war is extremely great because the cost of all of it is 
charged off as a war expense. These technological i:mprovements 
may be expected to burst forth on the economy after the war, and 
there .will then have been a heavy accumulation of them. These 
technological improvements lead to new industries which require 
their own investment which thereby contributes to total activity. 
On the side of debts, there has been and is continuing heavy debt 
retirement by our people. The Department of Commerce has esti-
mated that consumer instalment debts-to name but one impor-
tant class-will have been reduced from almost 11 billion dollars at 
the time of Pearl Harbor to less than four billion dollars by the 
encl of the present year. 
Thus, those consumers who do not accumulate financial reserves 
during the war will have a debt-free position to again buy on the 
instalment plan. That plan of finance after this war will be a tried 
and tested institution rather than in emqryo as was the case after 
the last war. 
These are some of the factors that specifically are the basis for a 
prospect for a high, not a low, national income after the war. To 
be sure, they depend fundamentally upon one crucial factor. That 
is, that we shall succeed in holding prices at a reasonable level 
throughout the war period. If that is done, the outlook will indeed 
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be most favorable after the war, because the favorable forces need 
not spend themselves in price skyrocketing as they did last_ time, 
but rather can exert their most powerful influence to an outburst in 
production that should permit the United States to achieve levels 
heretofore unknown, and levels that" will keep the tax base high, 
therefore, the tax yield high-all to maintain unimpaired the highest 
integrity any, debt ever had-'-the debt of our government. 
THE FUTURE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 
HERBER'r HEATON 
University of J1innesota 
This subject is not of my own choosing. I was drafted, and· must 
make three conscientious objections to the assignment. In the first 
place I am not a prophet. In the· second, I do not regard any po-
litical institution, distribution of power, or economic system as 
final, but history gives no clue to indicate what the next phase in 
the development of an empire or of a social order is likely to be. 
And in the third place, I cannot do either justice or mercy to· a 
quarter of the land surface of the world and to a quarter of its· 
population in thirty minutes. 
Let me begin by considering what is this Empire with whose 
future we are concerned. Some Britons would suggest it has 110 
future because it is already a thing of the past, and ·has given place 
to, or been transformed into, the British. Commonwealth of Na-
tions. If empire means the exercise by one nation of politicar con-
trol over other peoples of diverse origin and culture, the new name 
is more accurate than the old. ,vorld War I lifted the already inter-
nally self-governing dominions-Canada, Australia, New Zealand, 
and South Africa_:_to the rank of nations. The contributions they 
made to that war were a substantial fraction of the British Em-
pire's total effort. They were'larger still when measured in terms of 
the dominions' assets in human or physical resources; New Zealand· 
lost one in every 66 of her whole population, Australia one in every 
93, while our figure was one in every 2,000. They overshadowed the 
contrioutions made by many small nations; Canada for example, 
lost more men than Portugal put into the field. Thus at a great 
price the overseas dominions gained the right to be grown-up part-
ners,· associates, members of a British Commonwealth of Nations, 
and this title was hatched while the war was on. In addition they 
won recognition as nations in the world when they secured direct 
representation at the peace conference, signed the Treaty of Ver-
sailles, became foundation members of the League of Nations, and in 
three cases were given control of territory they had conquered, as 
"mandatory powers." · 
